Party Time
“聚会会议”听起来像是一个矛盾的话：会议是乏味的谈话，被免费酒水打断了，而聚会是免费的陶醉，这是一个愚蠢的时刻，试图谈论大声的音乐。在联合国气候变化框架框架大会上，本月晚些时候，前者比后者更可能发生在蒙特利尔。
The event is a typical U.N. phenomenon -- a regular meeting of signatory countries to an international agreement, meant to chart progress and hammer out further commitments. But this year's UNFCCC COP is special, because it is also the occasion of the first Meeting of Parties to the Kyoto Protocol -- which, despite being short of loud music and booze, and lacking peyote entirely, will be a veritable Burning Man for the climate-policy set.
Since agreement of detailed rules for the Kyoto Protocol four years ago in Morocco, most time at COPs has been spent twiddling thumbs, waiting for Kyoto to enter into force. It hardly made sense to tackle any new issues while the protocol, the main event, languished. Now, however, the meeting takes on fresh significance. Thus we get the first-ever MOP, concurrent with the COP, between Nov. 28 and Dec. 9.
Officially they are separate meetings, but with significant overlap, since almost all countries (the U.S. and Australia being glaring exceptions) are party to both agreements. We can expect some pomp and circumstance to mark the protocol finally coming into force and the continuation of some long-running detailed discussions interesting to few. And then there will be some new items of real importance -- including the first stabs at what will happen when Kyoto ends in 2012.
擦碎片
拖把的156个国家面临着包含一些实质性问题的议程。首先是，到目前为止，所有的“决策”都大大影响了该协议（从程序规则到排放交易计划的设计）只是草稿，必须由第一台MOP确认。这主要意味着四年前批准马拉喀什协定，这填补了协议的细节，并使各国有信心批准该协议。虽然预计不会出现故障（除非现在传统的沙特企图破坏），但批准这些决定至关重要。
沙特人可能会使他们的粉末干燥以进行另一个议程项目 - 在合规制度下定居。或者，换句话说，如何执行协议。该协议具有法律约束力，但是已经尝试使其更加艰难地击中诸如未能达到减少目标的惩罚之类的事情。该制度可以通过拖把的决定或修正案决定 - 沙特人提出了后者，这意味着可能需要数年的一轮民族审议。另一方面，决定需要几分钟。联合国民异inccc秘书处的议程对他们对这种情况的看法有些透明：它说（释义）：“ a：考虑沙特的修正案提议。b：无论如何都采用该决定。”
基本上所有各方都需要解决的另一个重要讨论是关于如何使清洁开发机制（CDM）更好地工作。这是一个制度，具有减少目标的发达国家可以从发展中国家的减排项目中购买“信用”。该过程目前充满了昂贵的箍；许多人批评CDM执行委员会的工作太慢，并说有太多的规则虽然旨在确保仅真正减少的信用获得信用，但使该过程几乎不值得追求。从增加董事会资金到分配许多规则，可能会产生负面的环境影响，从而有一些想法。
What also needs to be addressed at the political level is what happens to the CDM after Kyoto's first commitment period ends in 2012 -- if some other system takes its place, investors need to know that the stream of future credits coming from their current investments won't go lost. A guarantee that the CDM will continue in the future is needed to make it work now.
这将我们带入了议程上最重要的项目，这是京都协议第3款规定的。这指出，对未来的讨论，2012年后的目标需要在第一个承诺期结束之前七年开始 - 换句话说，今年。
But Hey, No Pressure
With the U.S. and Australia out of Kyoto and debate raging in Europe and Japan about how to reach an agreeable deal next time around, there's no telling what the future of the protocol will be. With the system's entire design in question, the process of deciding targets won't be the orderly task the drafters imagined.
So what will the future hold? The E.U. tends to favor the approach of continuing Kyoto-type targets and inviting the more-developed of developing countries (like South Korea or Mexico) to accept them, while coming up with transitional commitments for other countries. This could pull China and India into a step-wise process of making more specific commitments, for example. However, the U.S. seems intent on rejecting any agreement with fixed targets and timetables, in keeping with President Bush's general rejection of international agreements that put external pressure on internal policy and economic decisions. Developing countries, meanwhile, are generally wary of taking on anything smelling of a fixed target, given that they have pressing development needs and low emissions compared to developed countries.
尽管美国声称以技术开发以及双边或区域协议（例如亚太合作伙伴关系）的形式提供替代方案，但很难认真对待这一点，而没有同时愿景，即如何导致实际排放减少。但是，作为世界上最大的发射非洲人，美国几乎不需要做一些使其他国家重新考虑其方法的方法 - 例如，英国正在向后弯腰，试图找到一种方法来调和欧盟。和美国
我们不能指望蒙特利尔锤击京都或非京都期货的任何明确途径。事实是，国际谈判是缓慢的业务。但是我们可以预期，蒙特利尔会采用一些原则，可能是没有实际的行动计划 - 然后随后的COP/MOP将承担一些可行的任务，即确定某种妥协。
It is always possible, of course, that while paying lip service to the U.N. process, bodies like the G8 and the sorts of regional and bilateral agreements the U.S. is engaged in will slowly chip away at the content of the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol, to the point where it faces a crisis. If no real progress is made in the next couple of years, it will be time to reassess. Meanwhile, the usual diplomatic give-and-take will grind slowly along. One thing's for sure: it's no party.
---------
Jason Anderson is a research fellow at the欧洲环境政策研究所in Brussels. His work focuses on climate change and energy policy.
该专栏已重印为grist.org. It was first published on Nov. 16, 2005.
The event is a typical U.N. phenomenon -- a regular meeting of signatory countries to an international agreement, meant to chart progress and hammer out further commitments. But this year's UNFCCC COP is special, because it is also the occasion of the first Meeting of Parties to the Kyoto Protocol -- which, despite being short of loud music and booze, and lacking peyote entirely, will be a veritable Burning Man for the climate-policy set.
Since agreement of detailed rules for the Kyoto Protocol four years ago in Morocco, most time at COPs has been spent twiddling thumbs, waiting for Kyoto to enter into force. It hardly made sense to tackle any new issues while the protocol, the main event, languished. Now, however, the meeting takes on fresh significance. Thus we get the first-ever MOP, concurrent with the COP, between Nov. 28 and Dec. 9.
Officially they are separate meetings, but with significant overlap, since almost all countries (the U.S. and Australia being glaring exceptions) are party to both agreements. We can expect some pomp and circumstance to mark the protocol finally coming into force and the continuation of some long-running detailed discussions interesting to few. And then there will be some new items of real importance -- including the first stabs at what will happen when Kyoto ends in 2012.
擦碎片
拖把的156个国家面临着包含一些实质性问题的议程。首先是，到目前为止，所有的“决策”都大大影响了该协议（从程序规则到排放交易计划的设计）只是草稿，必须由第一台MOP确认。这主要意味着四年前批准马拉喀什协定，这填补了协议的细节，并使各国有信心批准该协议。虽然预计不会出现故障（除非现在传统的沙特企图破坏），但批准这些决定至关重要。
沙特人可能会使他们的粉末干燥以进行另一个议程项目 - 在合规制度下定居。或者，换句话说，如何执行协议。该协议具有法律约束力，但是已经尝试使其更加艰难地击中诸如未能达到减少目标的惩罚之类的事情。该制度可以通过拖把的决定或修正案决定 - 沙特人提出了后者，这意味着可能需要数年的一轮民族审议。另一方面，决定需要几分钟。联合国民异inccc秘书处的议程对他们对这种情况的看法有些透明：它说（释义）：“ a：考虑沙特的修正案提议。b：无论如何都采用该决定。”
基本上所有各方都需要解决的另一个重要讨论是关于如何使清洁开发机制（CDM）更好地工作。这是一个制度，具有减少目标的发达国家可以从发展中国家的减排项目中购买“信用”。该过程目前充满了昂贵的箍；许多人批评CDM执行委员会的工作太慢，并说有太多的规则虽然旨在确保仅真正减少的信用获得信用，但使该过程几乎不值得追求。从增加董事会资金到分配许多规则，可能会产生负面的环境影响，从而有一些想法。
What also needs to be addressed at the political level is what happens to the CDM after Kyoto's first commitment period ends in 2012 -- if some other system takes its place, investors need to know that the stream of future credits coming from their current investments won't go lost. A guarantee that the CDM will continue in the future is needed to make it work now.
这将我们带入了议程上最重要的项目，这是京都协议第3款规定的。这指出，对未来的讨论，2012年后的目标需要在第一个承诺期结束之前七年开始 - 换句话说，今年。
But Hey, No Pressure
With the U.S. and Australia out of Kyoto and debate raging in Europe and Japan about how to reach an agreeable deal next time around, there's no telling what the future of the protocol will be. With the system's entire design in question, the process of deciding targets won't be the orderly task the drafters imagined.
So what will the future hold? The E.U. tends to favor the approach of continuing Kyoto-type targets and inviting the more-developed of developing countries (like South Korea or Mexico) to accept them, while coming up with transitional commitments for other countries. This could pull China and India into a step-wise process of making more specific commitments, for example. However, the U.S. seems intent on rejecting any agreement with fixed targets and timetables, in keeping with President Bush's general rejection of international agreements that put external pressure on internal policy and economic decisions. Developing countries, meanwhile, are generally wary of taking on anything smelling of a fixed target, given that they have pressing development needs and low emissions compared to developed countries.
尽管美国声称以技术开发以及双边或区域协议（例如亚太合作伙伴关系）的形式提供替代方案，但很难认真对待这一点，而没有同时愿景，即如何导致实际排放减少。但是，作为世界上最大的发射非洲人，美国几乎不需要做一些使其他国家重新考虑其方法的方法 - 例如，英国正在向后弯腰，试图找到一种方法来调和欧盟。和美国
我们不能指望蒙特利尔锤击京都或非京都期货的任何明确途径。事实是，国际谈判是缓慢的业务。但是我们可以预期，蒙特利尔会采用一些原则，可能是没有实际的行动计划 - 然后随后的COP/MOP将承担一些可行的任务，即确定某种妥协。
It is always possible, of course, that while paying lip service to the U.N. process, bodies like the G8 and the sorts of regional and bilateral agreements the U.S. is engaged in will slowly chip away at the content of the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol, to the point where it faces a crisis. If no real progress is made in the next couple of years, it will be time to reassess. Meanwhile, the usual diplomatic give-and-take will grind slowly along. One thing's for sure: it's no party.
---------
Jason Anderson is a research fellow at the欧洲环境政策研究所in Brussels. His work focuses on climate change and energy policy.
该专栏已重印为grist.org. It was first published on Nov. 16, 2005.